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Ein Ansatz zur Intrusion Detection für 
Prozessautomatisierungssysteme
An Approach to Intrusion Detection 
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Overview
 Motivation  
 Industrial automation systems
 IS security / IDS for automation systems
 Proposed approach / prototype 
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Automation systems - Examples
 Automation domains
Steel, paper, cement, pharma,
petrochem, power gen/distrib, 
automotive, food, gas, water, 
transportation, ….
 Automation concerns
 Control of the process
 Control of the power supply
 Safety systems
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Motivation for protecting automation systems
 Threats (as usual)
 Random collateral damage
 Disgruntled employees
 Economic competition




 Loss of semi-finished goods
 Loss of production
 Destruction of plant
 Damage to environment 
(Release of chemicals)
 Damage to persons 
(Explosions)
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Automation systems – ISS relevant characteristics
 Security objective
 Prevent damages to humans and environment 
 Technically: availability – maintain control over the process at all times
 Network topology 
 Relatively small networks 
 Most important hosts not in the core, but at periphery
 Multiple zones in network
 Dial-up remote access
 Components
 Bounded reaction times required (hard real-time)
 Real-time operating systems w/o security mechanisms
 Operational environment: temperature, dust, humidity, vibration,…
 System life time 20 to 30 years
 Rare maintenance slots
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IDS for automation systems 
 Challenges
 Special industrial protocols
 Operators are no IT/security experts
 IT experts not on site
 High number of false alarms not acceptable
=> Today: IDSs not used in automation systems
 Chances
 Static Topology
 Few applications and services
 Deterministic network traffic and system state
 Isolation is often a suitable first response
 Process monitored 24x7 
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Proposed approach
 Operator as pattern matcher and decider
 Trained for detection of patterns in trends
 Knows reasons for certain deviations (e.g. maintenance)




 IDS user interface has to be integrated into PCS HMI
 Industry standard data exchange protocols (OPC)
 Quantitative data sources
 Related work: NCSA/UIUC on large scale visualization for IDS
=> Prototype/ feasibility study using ABB process control system
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Prototype – User interface
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Prototype: Data sources
 Security relevant data
 Routers, FWs
 Incoming/outgoing traffic
 Management activity, rule changes
 Network, Switches




 Processor load, uptime, resource usage
 Applications
 Successful/failed log-in
 Internal performance parameters
 …
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Summary/Conclusions
 Industry has need for IDS for automation systems
 Involving process operators offers chance for a practically 
usable system
 Prototype for experiments
 Limitations
 Not yet production quality
 First results promissing
 Further work
 Most suitable data sources
 Ergonomic user interface
 Field trial
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